



Collin County Citizens Defending Freedom and citizens were given 72 hours to create a response to the Election Office point of view.

We are confident that our 56-page response will be helpful to the Court.

Although we would have liked to have been given the opportunity to prepare a presentation, bring in an election expert to give insight, or ask any questions about the list, we are still grateful to begin this conversation.

We believe that every eligible US citizen should have the right to vote without their vote being diluted or manipulated. We want citizens to have confidence in their elections. And to that end, we will never stop advocating for genuine election integrity.

It is time to reevaluate the use of technology in elections and do everything we can to mitigate any danger it poses. To this end, we hope that the suggestions below (along with the extra evidence, reasoning, and counterarguments) will be taken seriously.

Sincerely,

Tara Schulte and Debbie Lindstrom

Citizens Defending Freedom – Collin County

Improvements to Elections in Order of Priority

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #1

Get rid of the machines (All of them-BMDs, Tabulators, Electronic Pollbooks, etc.).

RESPONSE

No Response

ANSWER:

There is no getting around the fact that these machines have been illegally certified. Nobody can rescue the fact that the ballots cannot be verified by the voter, and that the accreditation of VSTL labs is compromised by invalid signatures, expirations, and word salad redefinition of terms.

They are illegal by Federal Law.

1. 52 USC § 21081 requires a voting system (including the optical scanning voting systems used in Texas) to "permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted."

Texas voting machines only allow the voter to verify the TEXT and do not allow the voter to verify that bar codes from ES&S machines say the same thing as the TEXT, and THE OPTICAL SCANNERS ONLY RECORD THE SELECTIONS SPECIFIED BY THE BAR CODES. **IN OTHER WORDS, THE BAR CODES ARE THE VOTES AND THE VOTER CAN'T VERIFY THEM.**

This makes the machines illegal under this federal law.

2. They also violate HAVA 2002 Section 231 (A) & (B) which state:
Section 231 a (1) (42 USC 15371 a (1)) states "a) CERTIFICATION AND TESTING. (1) IN GENERAL. The Commission (Election Assistance Commission) shall provide for the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by **accredited** laboratories."

"(b) LABORATORY ACCREDITATION. (1) RECOMMENDATIONS BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY.—Not later than 6 months after the Commission first adopts voluntary voting system guidelines under part 3 of

subtitle A, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall conduct an evaluation of independent, non-Federal laboratories and shall submit to the Commission a list of those laboratories the Director proposes to be accredited to carry out the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification provided for under this section.

3. There are NO valid accredited testing labs. They have not been accredited since at least 2017. There is no valid accreditation certificate for Pro V&V, the testing lab for ES&S. No one can produce a valid VSTL accreditation certificate because there is not one in existence. (See Appendix A for more info on this)

They are illegal by State Law.

4. TX Election code § 122.001 Voting System Standards

- “(a) A voting system may not be used in an election unless the system:”
- “(3) operates safely, efficiently, and accurately and complies with the voting system standards adopted by the Election Assistance Commission;”

5. TX administrative code, rule § 81.60

- Voting system certification procedures
- “in addition to the procedures prescribed by the Texas election code, chapter 122, compliance with the following procedures is required for certification of a voting system.”
- “(3) the applicant must have the nationally accredited voting system test laboratory (VSTL) deliver a copy of all nationally qualified software/firmware and source codes for the system and/or system components requested for Texas certification, directly to the secretary of state no later than 45 days prior to examination.”

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #2

Go to Precinct Level Voting. County-wide is not auditable.

RESPONSE

In November 2020 Early Voting represented 93% of the total votes cast during that election. Currently, the only precinct voting option for Collin County would be to change Election Day voting, which was only 7% of the total ballots cast during the November 2020 Election. [Texas Election Code](#) (Sec. 85.003 and Sec. 85.066) requires Early Voting to be conducted in this countywide model. This recommendation would require a legislative change to Early Voting to be a true by precinct vote for both Early Voting and Election Day. It should be noted that countywide vote centers (which were established in Texas in 2006) reduced voter confusion by eliminating voters incorrectly casting their ballots at the wrong polling location (precinct), thus having their provisional ballot rejected. The vote center model allows any voter to cast their ballot anywhere in the County, just like during Early Voting.

Second, we believe that our current system is auditable using the countywide vote center model. Countywide voting can be audited by looking at in-person rosters and ballots cast at each location. This data can be sorted further at each location by precinct, which disproves this theory.

ANSWER:

1. 2020 was an anomaly. But even so, if 2024 turns out to be a similar or even greater turnout, the County can still allow Precinct Voting on Election Day for those who want to vote in their precinct. Denton County does this.
2. Convenience is not a valid excuse. The auditability of the election should take precedent over convenience.
3. Just because the Elections Office **believes** it is auditable, does not mean it is true. We share the opinion of the Secretary of State which complained about the auditability of countywide polling centers. Belief in a system must be backed up by facts.
4. <https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/fad/2020-Audit-Full.pdf>
5. The SOS says in its Audit of the 2020 Election Report that County-wide Program is not auditable. There are many quotes throughout the report that show problems with the Auditability of our elections. Here are just a few.

- a. One of FAD's goals was to reconcile data regarding the number of voters who checked in to vote and the number of ballots cast as reflected in the canvass. While this sounds simple, this process is complicated by the fact that all four counties use county-wide voting.... (80)
- b. This effort at reconciliation revealed issues with communication between voting equipment, issues with recording keeping, and issues with maintaining the proper chain of custody. (80)
- c. Data ... is less reliable. The inconsistency is primarily due to the fact that the four counties participate in the countywide polling place program. (171)

6. Recounts are more difficult and more expensive with County Wide Voting.

7. The Election Office says that the votes CAN be sorted by precinct at each location. But is that being done anywhere in the county? Instead of dismissing the issue due to convenience, we should work towards solutions that will make our elections more auditable.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

8. One way for large counties to handle the volume and need for polling places is to go to Consolidated Precinct Polling Places so that there can still be fewer locations AND the ballots can be stored by precinct.

9. With Consolidated Precinct Voting

- a. Polling locations are assigned based on precinct.
- b. Ballots are cast into ballot boxes per precinct.
- c. Larger locations may facilitate more precinct ballot boxes.
- d. Counties using machines would still have plenty of machines to accommodate.
- e. Ballots are auditable by precinct.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #3 (A)

Follow the law, not the SOS guidance when it is in clear contradiction to the stated law. Here are 2 examples:

- a. Numbering of ballots. Sec. 52.062. NUMBERING OF BALLOTS. The ballots prepared by each authority responsible for having the official ballot prepared shall be numbered consecutively beginning with the number "1."
 - i. We do not want the randomized number on the ballots. This is a feature that makes auditing difficult, if not impossible.
 - ii. ES&S has a feature to use randomized or sequential. Let's go back to sequential OR can we add a 2nd number for auditing purposes?
 - iii. Numbering idea: Stamp number on the back near signature. Set ten on a table. The voter can select their ballot. They will know their number. (THEN run through the printer for the Ballot Style/Precinct and other top info to be printed.)

RESPONSE

We believe that the section of Texas Election Code referenced above pertains to pre-printed ballots. The pre-printed mail ballots that go out to voters from Collin County are sequentially numbered beginning with "1", as outlined in [Sec. 52.062 of the Texas Election Code](#). The blank ballot stock that is used for our ballot marking devices are not pre-printed ballots, and serial numbers are assigned randomly with an alpha numeric code. This procedure is defined [Texas SOS Election Advisory No. 2019-23](#), and confirmed by [AG Opinion KP-0422](#). [Sec. 122.001 \(c\) of the Texas Election Code](#) "The secretary of state may prescribe additional standards for voting systems consistent with this title. The standards may apply to particular kinds of voting systems, to particular elements comprising a voting system, including operation procedures, or to voting systems generally." We believe that our current method of generating ballot numbers is more secure and auditable than the recommended method.

ANSWER:

The election office states that they believe this applies to pre-printed ballots. CDF believes that it applies to all ballots. So how do we decide?

We go to the law, while the Elections Office appears to rely on an opinion of an advisory regarding the law. The law is clear and should be followed. The law is king.

1. We have been told that ES&S might be able to accommodate sequential ballot numbering. If this is true, then turn it on and we will follow the law.

2. But if this is impossible, then they are in violation of the law:

Sec. 52.062. NUMBERING OF BALLOTS. The ballots prepared by each authority responsible for having the official ballot prepared shall be numbered consecutively beginning with the number "1."

3. It should be noted that the law does not give an exception to ballots printed on demand and inserted into marking devices. It was THE BALLOTS PREPARED – that would include the pre-printing of the header portion of the ES&S ballot.

4. It is true that the SOS is allowed to prescribe additional standards regarding elections. HOWEVER, this does not mean that they can add a standard which violates another law.

5. By allowing the executive branch to overrule clear and explicit law created and passed by the Legislative Branch, the SOS (part of the Executive Branch) is in a violation of the Separation of Powers Clause Art. 2, Sec. 1 of the Texas Constitution.

6. Further, because the Secretary is causing counties to violate Tex. Elec. Code 122.01(3)(4), this is a violation of the Suspension of Laws provision in Art. 1, Sec. 28 of the Texas Constitution. The Constitution provides that only the Legislature can suspend laws - not the Secretary, a member of the Executive Branch. By suspending laws and authorizing exceptions to Tex. Elec. Code § 122.01 (3), and other statutes, the Secretary is failing to perform his/her ministerial duty. Surely the Legislatures did not intend for any of these provisions to be waived, ignored, or violated. If any government official can simply ignore or modify laws as they wish, would that not render the legislature an invalid and useless branch of government.

7. Finally, we only gave two examples of the SOS giving guidance against the law. The issue is more widespread than just these two examples and that is continued with suggestion 3B below.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #3 (B)

Follow the law, not the SOS guidance when it is in clear contradiction to the stated law. Here are 2 examples:

1. Partial Manual Count—TEC 127.201 “general custodian of election records shall conduct a manual count of ALL the races in at least one percent of the election precincts or in three precincts, whichever is greater, in which the electronic voting system was used.”
 - a. The law says ALL races in three precincts.
 - b. Follow the law.

2. The SOS has issued guidance that says that counties that are enrolled in the County-Wide Polling Place Program may conduct the partial manual count by precinct **OR** by polling place. This is contrary to the law.

A hybrid method (recounting some ballots by precinct and some by polling place) is illegal, AND there is no SOS advisory stating anything about a hybrid method. Collin County Elections conducted the Partial Manual Count of the 2020 Election in this hybrid method.

RESPONSE

We believe that the method that we follow for conducting the partial manual recount is not contrary to Texas Election Code. [Election Advisory 2018-30](#) states: “For those counties that are participating in the Countywide Polling Place program, they have the option of completing the partial manual count in the traditional way by counting applicable ballots for a specific precinct or they may opt to conduct the partial manual count by polling place.” We believe that we are in compliance of the Texas Election Code, as we are following the guidelines outlined in the above Election Advisory.

ANSWER:

1. Again, the County leadership “believes” that they are following the law. Belief requires justification or it is an empty hope. The justification provided illustrates the exact opposite.

2. Laws are written with precise language. And the law indicates that the Partial Manual Count shall be done by precinct. And all of the races in those selected precincts should be counted.

3. The SOS has issued an Advisory to the Law that issues advice on that law and expands the law to include by precinct OR by polling place. Again, that is not what the law says. Nevertheless, the SOS advisory is best summarized to say that the County may choose option #1 OR option #2 – but they may not pick and choose and do a little of option #1 and then switch to option #2 when it is convenient. The SOS would have indicated “and/or” if they intended a hybrid method, but they did not. There is no “and” that would indicate that both methods can be used.
4. We call this picking and choosing a hybrid method of doing the partial manual count. How is this Hybrid method auditable?
5. I requested the emails to Collin County Elections asking for the directive to conduct the Partial manual count in this way in the 2020 General Election. They could not provide any documentation. I received the following response:

Mrs. Lindstrom,

The Collin County Elections Department has received your request(s) for records submitted on 7/28/2023. In this request for public information you requested:

Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code. Please produce all documents (emails, written communications, etc, to and from the Secretary of State or others) related to Mr. Breaux's statements that "polling locations" were used for the November 2020 partial manual recount instead of precincts. See the quotes below:

Mon, Dec 12, 2022 email from Mr. Breaux: "However, on Election Day we are asked to look at a vote center as a whole. The three polling locations or vote centers that the Secretary of State asked us to recount were:

1. First Melissa @2101 East Melissa Rd., Melissa 75454
2. Richardson Office Complex at 2703 N. Central Expressway, Richardson 75080
3. Josephine City Hall at 201 Main St., Josephine 75164...

...polling locations/vote centers are what are being manually recounted here."

Collin County and its Elections Department are committed to transparency and ensuring that the public has confidence in the voting process. During my search through records from the November 2020 election I was unable to locate the email from the Texas Secretary of State's office regarding the partial manual recount. The Texas Secretary of State's website does reference the PMR in [Election Advisory 2020-36](#), which I believe you stated in a previous email. It should be noted that the employee who was our partial manual recount lead and main contact with the SOS is no longer employed by Collin County, so I was unable to search through her emails.

Respectfully,



Kaleb Breaux
Deputy Elections Administrator
Collin County Elections
Phone: 972-547-1901
Fax: 972-547-1995
<https://www.collincountytx.gov/elections>

6. We have initiated a PIR to the State SOS asking for when they gave guidance that the so called “hybrid” method is to be used. Since the county does not have a record, we will see if the state has such a record and then we will know who might be legally liable for following the statute.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #4 (A)

Any future renewal of the contract with ES&S should require:

- a. The absence of the iDRAC8 component in the system.

RESPONSE

As stated in previous communications with members of this group, the iDRAC8 component was never connected to any part of the tabulation system or server. This tool was used briefly in 2019 during the data conversion of the ballot on demand/ballot by mail system, which printed mail ballots during the November 2019 Constitutional Amendment Election. This tool has not been used since 2019, and there is no objection from removing the tool from future renewal contracts with ES&S.

ANSWER:

The Election office states in their response that they have told us in the past that the iDRAC8 component was never connected to the tabulation system or server and how it was used by the elections office. This appears to be an incorrect answer for a very simple reason – and the resulting security implications are huge.

WHAT IS AN iDRAC?

An iDRAC is an integrated DELL Remote Access Controller (iDRAC). There is also something called a DRAC – that is a standalone external version of the iDRAC. The letter “i” in iDRAC stands for “integrated.” Simply put, an iDRAC is normally embedded in the chassis and steel of the server and most likely can not be removed. A simple inspection of the back of the DELL server would reveal the ports of the iDRAC if it is present.

Further – the Collin County contract with ES&S specifically lists the iDRAC as a component of the DELL EMS Server.

1	DELL POWEREDGE T430	\$7,200.00	\$7,200.00
	<p>PowerEdge T430 Server, No TPM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chassis with up to 8, 3.5" Hot Plug Hard Drives, Tower Configuration Intel® Xeon® E5-2620 v3 2.4GHz, 15M Cache, 8.00GT/s QPI, Turbo, HT, 6C/12T(85W) Max Mem 1866MHz • 1 CPU Standard • 2133MT/s RDIMMS • (2) 4GB RDIMM, 2133MT/s, Single Rank, x8 Data Width • RAID 1+ RAID 1 for H330/H730/H730P (2 + 2 HDDs or SSDs) • PERC H730 RAID Controller, 1GB NV Cache • (4) 2TB 7.2K RPM SATA6Gbps 3.5" Hot-Plug Hard Drive • On-Board Broadcom 5720 Dual Port 1Gb LOM • iDRAC8, Basic • DVD+/-RW, SATA, Internal • Casters for PowerEdge TowerChassis • Power Saving Dell active Power Controller • Dual, Hot-Plug, Redundant Power Supply (1+1), 750W (2) NEMA 5-15P to C13 Wall Plug, 125 Volt, 15 AMP, 10 Feet (3m), Power Cord, NorthAmerica • Keyboard and Optical Mouse, USB, Black, English Windows Server 2016, Standard Ed, Factory Inst, No MED, 2SKT, 2VM, NO CAL - Downgraded to Windows Server 2008 R2 Windows Server 2016, STD Ed, Media Kit w/Factory Inst ENT DGRD Images 5-pack of Windows: Server 2016 Device CALs (Standard or Datacenter) • 5 Year ProSupport and NBD On-Site Service 		

Now to the excuse given by the Election Office. We had asked the elections office for an explanation of the iDRAC, and the reply indicated that it:

“was used for our ballot on demand printers. In previous versions of Electionware, files had to be exported from our data and sent up to ES&S for conversion to use their Ballot on Demand software. After ES&S would convert those files, they would remote into a laptop; it was a standalone system that live(s)(ed) in the Early Voting Clerk’s office.”

The Elections Office states in their answer that the component was never connected to any part of the tabulation system or server.

If this is true, then this power DELL server was used for a mundane purpose and then it was retired. We find it incredulous that the County would waste money like this.

SECURITY EXPERTS

We have consulted with three different nationally recognized cyber-experts who all say that the primary purpose of an iDRAC8 is that it is used by IT Admins to remotely control a system. These three experts were all surprised and even shocked that an iDRAC would be anywhere near the election system. In fact, they said that under no circumstances should this component be there. It is an open back door that is an unacceptable vulnerability.

iDRAC accesses are NOT recorded in the Windows logs since Windows may not even be running. It may be possible to configure the iDRAC on the EMS to log iDRAC activities, but it would take special tools to retrieve that log (if it exists).

We are grateful that there is agreement between us to remove this component from future renewals of contracts; however, this component should not be anywhere near the current version we are using as it violates Standard 4 of the Texas Election Code 122.001 A. which says that voting machines in Texas MUST be “safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;” The presence of an iDRAC8 component on our current machines violates this standard as it is not safe from unauthorized manipulation.

Since the evidence appears to show the iDRAC integrated into the EMS server, we call on the county to follow the advice below in suggestion 4C to ensure that you are compliant with best security practices. **This needs immediate attention.**

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #4 (b)

Any future renewal of the contract with ES&S should require:

b. Access to the Source Code

RESPONSE

Collin County does not have access to the source code for our tabulation system. The Texas Secretary of State has possession of the source code for all voting systems used in across the State.

ANSWER:

Who can verify that the source code does not contain bad code?

Can the Elections office or other county entity nominate someone to inspect the software that the SOS has possession of?

When the secretary of state blindly ignores evidence of expired accreditation certificates, it does not breed trust that the other steps in the process are being handled correctly.

Can you help us have experts inspect the software that Collin County uses in its machines?

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #4 (c)

Any future renewal of the contract with ES&S should require:

c. A provision that after the source code is reviewed by independent CISSP professionals if they have legitimate concerns, the contract can be nullified.

RESPONSE

No answer.

ANSWER:

There is no reason why a termination clause could not be added to your next contract if the system is misrepresented or is found to have issues with the code or lack of best practices.

The Elections Office and Commissioners may trust the Secretary of State to review the software. That trust is misplaced in that they do not hold ES&S accountable by stating in the most recent Technical Examiner Reports that, for example ES&S has “addressed most of the issues” in the Hash Validation Bug found in EVS 6.1.0.0. (page 9 of the below link)

https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/brain-mechler_ess-exam-report_ evs6200.pdf

Mostly fixed?

Citizens want it to be fully fixed and this does not help the case for the SOS Validation procedures.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #5

Bring in a CISSP certified professional to secure the Main Elections office building (The timing of this evaluation needs to be discussed between all parties.)

- a. Ensure that the iDRAC8 component is removed from the Server.
- b. Evaluate the security between Dominion on one side and the Dallas Morning News on the other side of the Election Office and recommend improvements to the security of the Elections Office
- c. Check for any unsecure internet connections.
- d. Provide a public report of the findings and measures that were taken based on their recommendations.

RESPONSE

No answer.

ANSWER:

- 1. The vulnerabilities of the iDRAC8 are described above in Suggestion #4A
- 2. Many are unaware that our Main Election Office is in a strip mall and sandwiched between Dominion Voting on one side and the Dallas Morning News on the other side.
- 3. Dr. Walter Daugherity and Professor David Clements describe the implications of this scenario in this brief video. But the short answer is that the press and elections should be separated AND sharing a wall with Dominion Voting is a potential vulnerability that NEEDS to be investigated by an independent certified CISSP professional. (Certified Information Systems Security Professional).

<https://rumble.com/v32cx18-collin-county-elections-shares-walls-with-dominion-voting-and-the-dallas-mo.html>
- 4. Central Counting and polling machines are at this location and are turned on during an election. The closeness of Dominion Voting provides proximity to a hack at that site.
- 5. Since the Elections office is unaware of how the iDRAC can be exploited and how being sandwiched between Dominion Voting and the Dallas Morning News is not a

conflict, we would like an independent CISSP certified professional to insulate and isolate us from these vulnerabilities.

6. Since this issue is of interest to the public, we require a public report of the findings and measures taken to secure the Elections office.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #6

Get rid of Ballot Marking Device (BMD) and go to Hand-marked ballots.

- a. Ballots should have embedded security so that counterfeit ballots can be detected.
- b. Precinct level voting with enough ballots plus a little more of the correct ballot styles OR
- c. Ballot-on-Demand
- d. Here’s an idea for Ballots: color-code for Federal, State and Local elections.

RESPONSE

No answer.

MORE INFO:

<https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23846675-halderman-report>

1. The BMD is the machine used where a person inserts their ballot, touches the screen with their selections and it prints out their ballot selections with a barcode and the English underneath.

Alex J. Halderman is a professor of computer science and engineering at the University of Michigan and is known for his expertise in Election Machine vulnerabilities. He was charged as a subject matter expert to write a report in the Curling v Raffensberger case in Georgia. Here is a direct quote from that report.

“All voting systems face cybersecurity risks.” And quotes the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine who says: “[t]here is no realistic mechanism to fully secure vote casting and tabulation computer systems from cyber threats.”

<https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2023/06/14/security-analysis-of-the-dominion-imagecast-x/>

2. In a subsequent article after the report was released Halderman says: “The most effective remedy for the problems we found and others like them is to rely less on BMDs. The risk of attack is much lower when only a small fraction of voters use BMDs, as in most states, than when all in-person voters are forced to use them, as in Georgia.”

Collin County uses BMDs exclusively for in-person voting. The exception is curbside voting.

3. Is the election office in favor of ballots that can detect counterfeits?

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #7

Register of Ballots Form- (standardized form from SOS). This form reconciles how many ballots are used by a polling place. Collin County only uses this form on Election Day. It needs to be filled out daily, including during Early Voting so that there is a chain of custody of the ballots.

RESPONSE

This statement is incorrect, because Collin County uses ballot accountability forms during both Early Voting and Election Day.

ANSWER:

1. The statement given by the Election Office is partially true. There is a form that records most of the information found on the Election Day 'Register of Ballots Form.' However, it is missing a **key data point** – how many blank, signed, or initialed ballots were issued to the location, and a reconciliation of unused ballots at the end of each day of early voting.

2.. Here is what the Register of Ballots form looks like. It essentially reconciles the number of ballots given at the beginning of the day, the number of ballots used or spoiled and the number of ballots returned and accounted for at the end of the day to the office.

ELECTION DAY OFFICIAL REGISTER OF BALLOTS

NAME OF ELECTION: General Election DATE OF ELECTION: 11-3-2020
 POLLING LOCATION: Evans Elementary School

INSTRUCTIONS: This is **THE** most important form to be completed by the ELECTION JUDGE. Please fill in each of the lines below, sign, and place the top (white) copy in the Red Bag. Place the middle (yellow) copy in the Yellow Envelope. The bottom (pink) copy is the Judge's copy to keep.

A. * Number of Ballots Received	2000
B. Number of Voted Ballots Counted from <u>all DS200 results tapes</u> (The Election Judge will deliver the voted ballots in the DS200 Blue Ballot Box back to the Elections Department)	111
C. Number of Spoiled Ballots (Ballots returned by voters for replacements; Recorded on "Register of Spoiled Ballots" form and placed in Spoiled Ballot Envelope)	0
D. Number of Unused Ballots (After the polls are closed and the Blue Ballot Box is removed from the DS200, place the unused ballots in the empty area that formerly held the Ballot Box. Lock Door #1 with key and secure with plastic seal. Each unused packet contains 250 ballots.)	1,889
E. * Total Number of Ballots Accounted For (B + C + D) (Should match Number of Ballots Received in Row A)	2,000
F. Number of Voted Ballots on the ExpressTouch Curbside Voting Unit	0
G. Total number of labels on Yellow Combination Forms (Sticker Sheets)	111
H. Total number of names on Regular Yellow Poll Lists (Should match Row G)	111

Comments, if needed:

AFFIDAVIT
 I, the undersigned Presiding Election Judge, do hereby certify that the above foregoing statement of Official Register of Ballots of said Election is true and correct, and that all voted ballots were locked and sealed in the Blue Ballot Box returned by me and/or one of the clerks to the Elections Department.

WITNESS MY HAND this 3rd day of November 2020
 Presiding Judge: Kirk Roberts
 Alternate Judge: [Signature]

Place completed top White copy in Red Bag, Yellow copy in Yellow Envelope, and Pink Copy in Judge's Pink Envelope

3. There is another form EV Unused Ballot Accountability Form that is similar but does not track the number of ballots used and returned back to the office. It looks like this:

Collin County Revised 7/21

EARLY VOTING UNUSED BALLOT ACCOUNTABILITY FORM

DATE OF ELECTION: June 10, 2023 ELECTION NAME: Run off General
 POLLING LOCATION: Allen Municipal BALLOT BIN ASSET TAG #: 0267
 BALLOT BOX 1 OF 2

Note: Do not open a new Ballot Box until Box in use is empty.

DATE DELIVERED	SEAL NUMBER	QUANTITY OF BALLOTS DELIVERED
<u>5-24-2023</u>	<u>5018754</u>	<u>2,500</u>

Signature of Presiding Election Judge _____ Signature of Alternate Judge _____

ACCOUNTING

DATE	NUMBER OF BALLOTS WITHDRAWN	NUMBER OF BALLOTS REMAINING	RE-SEAL NUMBER	JUDGE/ALT JUDGE INITIALS	EXPLANATION
<u>6-30-23</u>	<u>2500</u>	<u>171</u>	<u>1196469</u> <u>on door 1</u> <u>machine</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	

RETURNED - Last day of Early Voting

DATE	NUMBER OF BALLOTS REMAINING	RE-SEAL NUMBER	COMMENTS
<u>6-6-23</u>	<u>171</u>	<u>door 1196469</u>	

Signature of Presiding Election Judge _____ Signature of Alternate Judge [Signature]

On the last day of Early Voting place the yellow copy in the Yellow Envelope and the pink copy in the Judge's Pink Envelope.

4. There is one more form called the EV Daily Report. This form has some of the information from the Register of Ballots form. But does not verify how many blank ballots were issued to a location, and then reconcile voting transactions that occurred that day and unused ballots to ensure that ALL ballots are accounted for.

Collin County Revised 11/21

EARLY VOTING DAILY REPORT FORM - GENERAL ELECTION

ELECTION: General 11/08/2022

POLLING LOCATION: Men SD Service Center

END OF DAY TOTALS FOR (DATE): 10/24/2022

Total number of signatures from Combination Forms (Yellow Sticker Sheets): 164 ✓ 5/16 767

Total number of names from Regular Yellow Poll Lists: 164 ✓ 5/16 767

Total number of names from Green Provisional Combination Forms (Sticker Sheets): 4 ✓

Total number of names from Green Provisional Poll Lists: 4 ✓

Total number of spoiled ballots (for today only) from Register of Spoiled Ballots: 7 ✓

Total number of Purple Reasonable Impediment Forms for today: —

Total number of Curbside Voters (from Poll List): 3 ✓

Total number of Limited Ballot Voters (Main Early Voting Location Only): —

Total number of "Public Count" from each DS200 and ExpressTouch listed below (running total for election):

EQUIPMENT	ASSET TAG #	PUBLIC COUNT #
DS200 #1	<u>0154</u>	<u>—</u>
DS200 #2	<u>0162</u>	<u>341</u>
DS200 #3	<u>0046</u>	<u>422</u>
ExpressTouch #1	<u>0155</u>	<u>3</u> ✓
ExpressTouch #2	<u>0024</u>	<u>—</u>
CUMULATIVE TOTAL		<u>166</u>

Comments, if any: see Incident Report

Judge's Signature: [Signature] Date: 10/24/22

Place the Yellow & Green copies of this completed form in the Yellow Early Voting Daily Report Envelope with the following items. Place the Pink copy in the Early Voting Judge's Pink Envelope. Place the printed daily Close Poll Report label from each pollbook on the backside of the yellow copy of this form.

- Zero Totals Tape printed from 1st day of opening DS200 (First Day Event Only)
- Zero Totals Tape printed from 1st day of opening ExpressTouch (First Day Event Only)
- Daily Configuration Report from opening of DS200
- Combination Forms (Yellow Sticker Sheets)
- Regular Poll Lists – Yellow and Blue copies
- Green Provisional Combination Forms (Sticker Sheets)
- Green Provisional Poll Lists – Green and Blue copies
- Orange Spoiled Ballot Envelope with Daily Spoiled Ballot Register inside
- Completed Purple Reasonable Impediment Forms
- Completed Statements of Residence
- Completed Voter Registration Applications
- Completed Poll Worker Address Change Forms
- Completed New Hire Paperwork
- Completed Similar Name Change Forms
- Completed Notice to Purge Deceased Voter Forms
- Completed Request to Cancel Mail Ballot Application (including the surrendered ballot)
- Completed Incident Report Form(s)

Verified by Office: _____ Date: _____

Ballot Board comments, if any: _____

5. We are advocating for a chain of custody for ALL ballots. The number of ballots given to each location at the beginning of the day should match the number of ballots used or spoiled and the number of ballots given back to the office at the end of the day.

6. And this tracking should be done for all ballots, used and unused. Custody of ballot MUST be ensured during the entire election period.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #8

Increase the Text Font on the bottom of the Ballot – so that voters can read their ballot, especially those who wear glasses or are visually impaired. Also, if we are allowed to hand-count, this step will help auditors to not strain when reading the ballots during auditing.


RESPONSE

Text size is determined by the number of contests/issues and responses on the ballot for that given election. We will review the font size on the ballot card on an election by election basis to ensure that we are using the maximum allowable font size for that election.


ANSWER:

CDF is grateful that the Elections Office will review this. Here is a Ballot Image from the 2020 General Election.

FRONT:



BACK:



There is a lot of unused space that could have been used to increase the font size during this election.

Can both sides of the ballot be utilized?

Of course, if the county went to hand marked ballots, the current version of the Absentee ballot could be used. Not only are the absentee ballots more easily read, they would also be more easily audited by citizen auditors.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #9

Allow voters to mark a hand-marked ballot at the Main Elections office instead of using a Ballot Marking Device (BMD).

RESPONSE

This recommendation is not allowable by Texas Election Code. Texas Election Code does not permit two methods of voting in a polling location during a voting period. [Sec. 123.005 \(b\) of Texas Election Code](#) address this scenario specifically.

ANSWER:

1. Can the Elections Office set up a secondary polling place where hand marked ballots can be cast?
2. If not, we request a return all hand marked ballots for everyone who votes in person—except those who require assistance (curbside, visually impaired, etc.) which should be a limited number of voters
3. Denton County uses hand marked ballots for most of their voters. We participated in an audit of their 2020 ballots and did not see any ballots that were in question as to the intent of the voter.
4. However, education on how to fill out a ballot can help to alleviate issues with those who overvote. If an absentee ballot is returned and has two bubbles filled in, then it is considered an overvote and neither vote counts. This would be similar if a voter hand marked a ballot in person and made two selections. It still would be considered an overvote.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #10

County Judge and Commissioners advocate for transparency and accuracy in the voting roster. The number of voters, names and VUIDS should match from the Precinct to the County to the State. If they do not match, do not certify the election.

RESPONSE

Voter rosters at the County level will sometimes differ from the rosters at the State level due to records being updated locally. We have seen this occur when a voter begins an election on a mail ballot roster, and then changes their mind mid-election, and votes in-person. Data communicated up to the SOS is one way, and once a voter is flagged as a BBM voter, there is no path for recourse at the State level. It has been noted on the SOS webpage that hosts these rosters at the State level that "All information displayed is provided by county election officials. The Office of the Secretary of State does not alter or modify the data provided in any way. For questions related to this information, please contact the appropriate county election official." It should be noted that [Texas Election Code Sec. 127.131](#) requires the presiding judge of the central counting station to reconcile ballots cast to voter rosters. A county commissioners' court does not have authority to refuse to canvass election results.

ANSWER: (guest editorial by Todd Lindstrom for CDF)

There are three parts to this question. 1) numbers matching, 2) names matching, 3) certifying (canvassing) the election. I will address in reverse order.

CERTIFYING (CANVASSING)

<https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-results-canvass-and-certification>

Canvassing (according to the EAC) is, "a culmination of all the data generated during an election cycle. More importantly, it is a process that allows election officials to confirm the accuracy of election data and identify areas for improvement. The canvass process aggregates and confirms every valid ballot cast and counted, including mail, uniformed and overseas citizen, early voting, Election Day, and provisional ballots. "

I would add based on Collin County documents from 2020, canvassing also includes monitoring unused ballots.

TEC 127.131 rightfully says that the central counting station judge signs and certifies the accuracy of an election. But there is much more to this process. A simple look at

official documents from 2020 show the canvassing process (which is also outlined in TEC 67.002 and 67.004

First the Central Counting Judge certifies the election and the official output. In more recent elections the SOS has mandated the use of reconciliation reports.

These forms were instituted in 2022 so there would have been some other method of certification of the accuracy of the election by the central counting judge.

Election Reconciliation - Official Totals

County: Collin Election Name: November 8, 2022 - General
 Registered Voters: 696,712 Election Date: 11/8/2022

1. Voters <small>(from election voters list data)</small>		2. Rejected ballots		3. Counted ballots <small>(from tabulation outputs)</small>	
A. Early voting in person voters	<u>253,746</u>			I. Early voting ballots counted	<u>253,654</u>
B. Election day in person voters	<u>99,534</u>			J. Election day ballots counted	<u>99,502</u>
C. Mail ballot voters	<u>12,672</u>	F. Mail ballots rejected	<u>108</u>	K. Mail ballots counted	<u>12,564</u>
D. Provisional ballots submitted	<u>1741</u>	G. Provisional ballots rejected	<u>1293</u>	L. Provisional ballots counted	<u>448</u>
E. Total voters (A+B+C+D)	<u>367,693</u>	H. Total ballots rejected (F+G)	<u>1401</u>	M. Total ballots counted (I+J+K+L)	<u>366,168</u>

4. Comparison of voters and counted ballots

N. Difference between voters and ballots (E-H M) 124 O. Difference as percentage of voters (N/(E+H)*100) .03385%
 P. Explanation for difference, if any: Blank ballots

5. Attestation

Q. "I certify that the information contained in this document accurately reflects the official reconciliation of votes and voters from the above listed election"

Kathi-Ann Rivard Kathi-Ann Rivard 11/16/22
 Presiding judge signature Print name Date

6. Mail ballots		7. Provisional ballots	
R. Mail ballots sent	<u>15,937</u>	U. Provisional ballots deemed incomplete	<u>0</u>
S. Mail ballots not returned by voter	<u>1556</u>		
T. Mail ballots surrendered	<u>702</u>		


**STATE OF TEXAS § CANVASS OF THE
GENERAL ELECTION**

COUNTY OF COLLIN § November 3, 2020

I, Bruce Sherbet, the undersigned Elections Administrator of Collin County, do hereby certify that I have made an actual check and comparison of all the ballots tabulated as voted with the Return Sheets, and the unused ballots as recorded on the Register of Official Ballots. I, therefore, make the following report of my findings from the November 3, 2020 General Election that was held in Collin County, Texas.

I hereby certify the results to be a full, true and correct tabulation, audit and count of the votes cast in the said election.

WITNESS, my hand on this the 10th day of November 2018.


Bruce Sherbet
Elections Administrator
Collin County

State of Texas	§	Court Order
Collin County	§	2020-1136-11-11
Commissioners Court	§	

An order of the Collin County Commissioners Court canvassing election results.

In accordance with Texas Local Government Code section 67.002, the Collin County Commissioners Court hereby accepts the canvass results of the November 3, 2020 General and Special Elections, as detailed in the attached documentation.

A motion was made, seconded, and carried by a majority of the court members in attendance during a regular session on Wednesday, November 11, 2020.


Chris Hill, County Judge

Not Present

Susan Fletcher, Commissioner, Pct 1

Not Present

Cheryl Williams, Commissioner, Pct 2




Darrell Hale, Commissioner, Pct 3

Not Present

Duncan Webb, Commissioner, Pct 4


ATTEST: Stacey Kemp, County Clerk

Second – The Elections administrator certifies the results. Here is the document prepared by the Elections administrator for the 2020 General Election.

This is specified by TEC 67 accompanied by tabulations and election results.

Then the County Commissioners Court produces the first of two orders. In this first order, a quorum of two commissioners is required, and this is where the Commissioners Court accepts the canvas results.

(note the picture of the document was modified to remove whitespace for the sake of this document)

Finally, the second order from the Commissioners Court is enacted which is a legal court order approving the filing of the election. These are just portions of this document.

State of Texas	§	Court Order
Collin County	§	2020-1190-12-07
Commissioners Court	§	

An order of the Canvass Election Special Session Commissioners Court approving the filing of the November 11, 2020 minutes.

On Wednesday, November 11, 2020 the Commissioners Court of Collin County, Texas, met in Special Session in the Commissioners Courtroom, Jack Hatchell Collin County Administration Building, 4th Floor, 2300 Bloomdale Road, City of McKinney, Texas, with the following members present, and participating, to wit:

 Chris Hill, County Judge		 Darrell Hale, Commissioner, Pct 3
 Susan Fletcher, Commissioner, Pct 1		 Duncan Webb, Commissioner, Pct 4
Not Present Cheryl Williams, Commissioner, Pct 2		 ATTEST: Stacey Kemp, County Clerk
<small>Canvass Election Special Session Commissioners Court Minutes • November 11, 2020</small>		

We may grant that canvassing is mandatory. Where we would respectfully disagree with the answer provided above is that final approval is provided by the commissioners court.

For just shy of two years now, evidence of the unlawful certification of the election machines has been presented to Judge Hill, the Election Administrator and members of the commissioners court. Couple that with the illegal nature of the ballot (see suggestion 1 above), it would appear that the Election Administrator and the Commissioners have authorized and certified an election using an illegal election system.

PARTS II and III – number and name mismatches between state and county

Canvassing an election is something that happens at multiple levels.

1. We used to vote in Precincts and a precinct judge would certify precinct level counts.
2. Now we use county-wide voting centers, but the voting center judge performs checks and balances which is fed to the ballot board for consistency checks.
3. COLLIN COUNTY BALLOT BOARD PROCESSES ARE ABSOLUTELY THE BEST IN TEXAS
4. Then the county level canvass happens which was discussed in the prior section
5. Then the results are given to the SOS and a state level canvass is held.
6. In national elections the numbers are further aggregated and certified at the national level.

It is my opinion that election result numbers should match throughout the chain of aggregation.

PRECINCT

COUNTY

STATE

NATIONAL

Our original question was just a suggestion that if there is a discrepancy in State vs County numbers or rosters, that it should be cleared up prior to certification.

At the same time, we realize that our request would be more appropriate to be asked of the next level up (the State.) However, for the purpose of this document, it is important to establish that County and State numbers do not match. This should be a source of concern for everyone in the State. We cannot afford for the prevailing opinion to be that of, “That’s up to the State – they will do whatever they want”

NO – This is an opportunity for the lesser magistrate to stand up and demand that State numbers align.

NAME MISMATCHES

The official response needs a little bit of correction. Here is that response again:

Voter rosters at the County level will sometimes differ from the rosters at the State level due to records being updated locally. We have seen this occur when a voter begins an election on a mail ballot roster, and then changes their mind mid-election, and votes in-person. Data communicated up to the SOS is one way, and once a voter is flagged as a BBM voter, there is no path for recourse at the State level. It has been noted on the SOS webpage that hosts these rosters at the State level that "All information displayed is provided by county election officials. The Office of the Secretary of State does not alter or modify the data provided in any way. For questions related to this information, please contact the appropriate county election official." It should be noted

In the example cited, notice that the voter is initially flagged as a BBM (Ballot By Mail) voter, but then they change their mind (surrender the ballot) and votes in-person. The problem with this scenario is that requesting and receiving a ballot in the mail does not make you a mail-in **voter**.

A person does not become a voter until the ballot is received, processed, and validated. At this point the person no longer is in possession of their ballot – and there is no way to switch to in-person voting at that point.

In the scenario given, the county would have incorrectly communicated the initial method of voting. If this is happening then there may be a process correction that is needed.

However, it goes deeper. Another example involves an elderly couple in Plano Texas (names withheld.) Initially they were on both the county and state roster for the March 2022 Primary. But then months later, they were removed from the state list even though they remain on the county roster. Given the fact that the state supposedly does not modify data, then we ask if or why the county had them removed.

It is likely that the county did not make this adjustment, and the State disclaimer is not accurate, and this needs investigation.

NUMBER MISMATCHES

Analysis of recent elections shows that there are county and state mismatches in every county in Texas. Collin is not an exception to the rule. Here are some examples from the November 2022 General Election (NOV 8, 2022)

There are 5 document samples, and they are annotated with LETTERS for each mismatched number. Then you are invited to compare the numbers for letter A and come to your own conclusion.

In some cases, we think that the State reporting is sloppy – and that is not to be attributed to the county.

DOCUMENTS:

1. (County) Election Reconciliation OFFICIAL TOTALS – Signed by Central Counting Election Judge
2. (State) Texas State Official Early Voting Report
3. (State) Official Collin County Turnout (we think this number is sloppy)
4. (State) Official Election Day Voting Information
5. (County) Final ES&S Accumulated totals

Election Reconciliation - Official Totals

County Collin Election Name November 8, 2022 - General
 Registered Voters 696,712 Election Date 11/8/2022

1. Voters <small>(from election rosters and lists)</small>		2. Rejected ballots		3. Counted ballots <small>(from tabulation software)</small>		
A. Early voting in person voters	253,746	A		I. Early voting ballots counted	253,654	A
B. Election day in person voters	99,534			J. Election day ballots counted	99,502	D
C. Mail ballot voters	12,672	F. Mail ballots rejected	108	K. Mail ballots counted	12,564	C
D. Provisional ballots submitted	1741	G. Provisional ballots rejected	1293	L. Provisional ballots counted	448	
E. Total voters (A+B+C+D)	367,693	H. Total ballots rejected (F+G)	1401	M. Total ballots counted (I+J+K+L)	366,168	B

4. Comparison of voters and counted ballots		
N. Difference between voters and ballots (E-H-M)	124	O. Difference as percentage of voters (N+(E-H)*100)
		.03385%
P. Explanation for difference, if any	<input type="text" value="Missing voters"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	

Official Early Voting - November 04, 2022

Disclaimer: All information displayed is provided by county election officials. The Office of the Secretary of State does not alter or modify the data provided in any way. For questions related to this information, please contact the appropriate [county election official](#).

November 08, 2022
GENERAL ELECTION
 Cumulative Totals
 Thru Close of Business
 November 04, 2022

County	Registered Voters	# In Person On 11/04/2022	Cumulative In-Person Voters	Cumulative % In-Person	Cumulative By Mail Voters	Cumulative In-Person And Mail Voters	Cumulative Percent Early Voting	Voter Details Report
COLLIN	693,753	33,763	253,727	36.57%	11,014	264,741	38.16%	Click Here



- Participating
- Not Participating
- Reporting
- ENR Complete
- Canvas Complete
- Selected County

Search County

PRECINCTS REPORTING
VOTER TURNOUT
POLLING LO

Registered Voters	Votes Cast	Voter Turnout
693,753	364,779	52.58%

COLLIN
B
^

Official Election Day Voting Information - November 08, 2022

Disclaimer: All information displayed is provided by county election officials. The Office of the Secretary of State does not alter or modify the data provided in any way. For questions related to this information, please contact the appropriate [county election official](#).

November 08, 2022
GENERAL ELECTION
 Cumulative Totals
 Thru Close of Business
 November 08, 2022

County	Registered Voters	# In Person On 11/08/2022	Cumulative In-Person Voters	Cumulative % In-Person	Cumulative By Mail Voters	Cumulative In-Person And Mail Voters	Voter Turnout	Voter Details Report
COLLIN	693,753	99,965	353,707	51.0%	12,434	366,141	52.78%	Click Here

D

C

B

Summary Results Report
 General And Special Election
 November 8, 2022

All Races Results FINAL
 Combined Accumulated Totals
 COLLIN COUNTY

Statistics

	TOTAL	Election Day	Early Voting	Ballot By Mail	Provisional Ballots	Limited Ballots
Registered Voters - Total	696,712					
Ballots Cast - Total	366,168	99,502	253,049	12,564	448	605
Voter Turnout - Total	52.56%					

B

D

The reader can compare these numbers. Is it possible that some of these numbers are apples to oranges comparisons? That may be true, but that should be noted. The State document should not say a form is OFFICIAL if it diverges from the county. AND THE COUNTY SHOULD BE OFFENDED THAT THE STATE IS DOING SUCH A POOR JOB.

To emphasize I'll just highlight two of these discrepancies.

BOX D – Election Day Voter Totals

1. 99,502 (County Reconciliation)
2. 99,965 (State Election Day)
3. 99,502 (ES&S)

BOX B – Total Voter Turnout

1. 366,168 (Reconciliation Report)
2. 364,779 (THE state turnout page with the map)
3. 366,141 (State Official Election Day Report)
4. 366,168 (ES&S)

There are some issues documented in this section that need attention. The original suggestion was an attempt to address these issues. There may be other ways and other investigations that happen. Please see to it that the county does not let the SOS play games with the votes and voters of Collin County.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #11

CVR available before canvassing and certifying election.

RESPONSE

Sec. 1.012 (f) of the Texas Election Code, which was recently amended by House Bill 5180, states "Beginning on the first day after the date the final canvass of an election is completed, the general custodian of election records shall make available for public inspection election records that are: (1) images of voted ballots, if a county maintains images of voted ballots; or (2) cast vote records." We will comply with the requirements of the above mentioned Texas Election Code.

ANSWER:

Thank you for posting the law and for agreeing to follow.

We would also request that the CVR be in the order of receipt and not randomized. Because randomized CVRs undermine transparency.

It appears that the CVRs have been randomized in recent elections. If this change was made, then did the system get recertified after that change?

Has the election office moved to a different version of software from ES&S EVS 6.1.1.0?

Dr. Walter Daugherty, Computer Science Professor Emeritus from Texas A&M, says that he has analyzed three hundred CVRs from across the country, and only two appeared to be normal.

Interestingly, one of the two "normal CVR" counties was from Denton County.

Could it be that their normal CVR distribution is since they use precinct voting on election day with hand marked ballots?

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #12

Allow citizens to take a picture of their ballot.

RESPONSE

Sec. 61.014 of the Texas Election Code prohibits the use of a recording device within 100 feet of a polling location.

ANSWER:

We understand what the law says and will advocate through the legislature to amend this law.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #13

According to the SOS website, the duties of the Election Commission are to hire, fire and monitor the Election Administrator. The citizens want oversight of the office. It appears that the SOS has assigned this oversight duty to the Election Commission, even though it is not explicit in the law. We would like the Commission to schedule a quarterly meeting and allow the public to address concerns that they have about elections and Election Office operations.

RESPONSE

Texas Election Code limits the duties of the Election Commission in each county to hiring, firing, or taking disciplinary actions relating to the position of elections administrator. Attorney General Opinion LO-88-62 concludes this by stating "the legislature did not intend the Elections Commission to be involved in the day-to-day performance of the administrator's job."

ANSWER:

1. In the glossary on the SOS website, they assign the duty of monitoring the election to the Election Commission. We do not expect micromanaging.
<https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/glossary.shtml>

2. Everyone should be adhering to the LAW and not solely referencing what the SOS says. If the law says X and the SOS says Y, then we should go with the law. This has been our point for over a year.

3. In light of that, what the Elections Office or Judge Hill is telling us is that there is no monitoring or oversight of the Collin County elections office from any official in Collin County.

4. Therefore, this puts this duty back on the public. And CDF will continue to monitor the Elections Office, and we will not stop bringing up issues and concerns to the Elections Office, the Commissioners Court, the public, and the Sheriff if necessary.

5. No one said that the Elections Commission needed to be involved in the day-to-day performance of the administrator's job – that would be micro-managing. What we expect is oversight and monitoring.

6. It is a bad look that there is no official entity that is in place to monitor the Elections office.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #14

Ballot Marking Device – wording on screen.

- a. Currently says something like: “Thank you for voting.” At this point they have not voted.
- b. Change wording to something like: “Read your ballot, make sure your selections are correct, then please deposit your ballot into the tabulator.”

RESPONSE

This recommendation seems like a reasonable ask. The Elections Department will explore the possibility of making these changes.

ANSWER:

Thank you. CDF thinks this will clarify for voters, so they do not walk out without depositing their ballot into the tabulator.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #15

Public Awareness campaign on Reading your Ballot after it is marked.

- a. newspaper, TV ad, FB ads, website, etc.
- b. Train judges/clerks/workers to notify voters to read their ballot before putting in the tabulator.

RESPONSE

Notices are posted in the polling place, and election workers are trained to notify voters to read the ballot before depositing into the tabulator. The Elections Department will add a reminder to “read your ballot after it is marked” on the Elections website.

ANSWER:

Thank you. Please make this as visible to the public as possible.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #16

County notification to all voters informing them of upcoming elections and polling locations by email.

RESPONSE

Voter registration files do not contain email addresses.

ANSWER:

This was only a suggestion. Thank you for clarifying that this is not possible at this time.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION #17

Place the Logic and Accuracy Test notification on the front page of the Elections webpage.

RESPONSE

This recommendation seems like a reasonable ask. The Elections Department will explore the possibility of posting a quick link to all notices on the first page of the Elections website. The Notice of Public Test is currently posted in the notices section of the webpage, which is the appropriate spot for the notice.

ANSWER:

Thank you for considering this suggestion. Making key announcements obvious to the public seems prudent.



We appreciate that Judge Hill has added “Election Integrity” to the Commissioners Court agenda.

However, what citizens truly desire is an honest 2-way conversation.

There are things that we may not understand about the process that could be cleared up by a real conversation. And vice-versa.

Election Integrity is bigger than one commissioners court meeting can solve, SO we are asking for ongoing meetings—perhaps even a debate, a Think-tank, or a task force—where subject matter experts and the public can listen to both sides of the aisle and work towards solutions to make our Collin County elections the most transparent, accurate and accountable elections in the country.

Appendix A

CDF did not produce this document. However, it provides additional information relevant to certifications, so we included it.